

The City Upon a Hill

Created by Principle, Divided by Interest

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History 106A

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Midterm Essay Revision

The history of this nation, in less than 50 years, has proven to be inseparably connected in its affairs with foreign nations. Our own independence was declared in large part due to the acts of one such foreign nation, that of Great Britain. Though we were once a part of that nation, we were treated as a foreign entity as the King enforced British will upon us. Our legislatures were without power while they “declare[d] themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.” It became necessary for our colonies to declare independence, and to take full personal responsibility for the powers to “levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts” necessary for the securing of our “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”¹ Principles of self-reliance, honoring agreements, respecting personal liberties, and defending national honor formed the spirit of our liberation, but have often been found in conflict with our interests. Ideally, our interests should complement our principles, as they did in regards to our independence. History has shown that on this balance of principle and interest, our interests often compete against our said principles, and they almost always take precedence.

Long before this nation was declared independent, a people came to this continent to escape religious persecution and to live according to just principles. It was believed that this continent could shed forth the light of these principles “as a City upon a Hill,”² and that by abiding by their principles, God would increase their interests. The Puritans believed that in living according to principles of “brotherly affection” and taking “delight in each other,” God would “dwell among [them]” and enhance their interests of “His wisdom, power, goodness, and truth,” thus enabling them “to resist a thousand of [their] enemies.”³ Since those early beginnings, we have grown to understand that if “the eyes of all people are upon us,”⁴ the world must recognize our independence and our zeal for the principles that have blessed us with an abundance of happiness.

At the time of our Declaration of Independence, it became immediately necessary to consider our status within the world. If we were to be recognized as independent states as we had professed to be, we needed to consider our relations with other nations and how they viewed this pronouncement. Most of the nations of the current world have existed long before this land was even discovered by our Puritan ancestors. Although our nation was young, we could not allow others to view these independent states as weak or naïve. If other nations could see our vulnerabilities, our liberty would be in danger of other European nations' ambitions for conquest, and that threatened our various interests.

Immediately following the Declaration of Independence, we experienced the first test of our character. We found ourselves in the midst of a difficult war fighting for that independence. As we faced one of the world's most challenging empires, we needed to decide whether or not we wanted, or needed, to seek the help of other nations. This meant seeking alliance with other nations that might join us, whether it was in the name of liberty or simply due to their having a mutual enemy in England. This naturally led to France. The French would by no means fight for our causes, because they had their own interests. By fighting against Britain, France sought to lower the "height of power and preeminence" that the British Crown enjoyed "by the conquest of Canada and her naval triumphs during the [Seven Year's] War."⁵

Before the foundation of this nation could even be set, we needed to answer the very first question in regards to foreign relations. To what extent should we involve ourselves with other nations, particularly those of Europe? For centuries, Europe had been embroiled in wars against themselves and others. We were already fighting one European nation, but was it necessary for an additional nation to enter the war? France could prove to be an effective ally in a war against Britain, which they certainly did by the end of the

Revolutionary War, but did their helping us require our hands to turn in defense of them in some future period? John Adams understood this question well, and feared that in allying ourselves to any nation of Europe, we would “become too subordinate and dependent on that nation, and should be involved in all European wars, as we had been hitherto.”⁶ Our declaration was one of independence, and our stated goal was not in joining ourselves in the race against European power and domination, but for independence from tyranny. This was not all, however, for our interest required equal opportunities within the world of commerce. Adams argued that in considering treaties with foreign nations, “we ought to confine ourselves strictly to a treaty of commerce.”⁷ Adams, along with other revolutionary leaders, wanted “France to be obligated in the Model Treaty without cost to [American interests].”⁸ This separation of politics and commerce was carefully upheld in the construction of our Constitution. Congress has been given power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations,” while the President has been given power “to make treaties.”⁹ President George Washington made it very clear that although he had the power in regards to making treaties with foreign nations, “in extending our commercial relations [we should] have with them as little political connection as possible.”¹⁰

History has shown that despite our understanding of these principles of self-reliance, compromises have often been made against such principles when the interests of the United States are likely to benefit. Two years after the Declaration of Independence, out of necessity to preserve our interests, both treaties of commerce and of alliance were signed with France. These treaties brought France to our aid, and likely were determining factors in our victory. Both treaties were very careful in their wording, proclaiming the American desire, despite our alliance, to remain neutral following the war. In the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, our principles were set forth and “stipulated that free Ships shall also give a

freedom to Goods, and that every thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt.”¹¹ Thus, after the war, the United States could maintain its neutrality while its commercial activities could grow, despite future European conflicts. Also, in the Treaty of Alliance, our dedication to “aid each other mutually” was specific to “during the continuance of the present War between the United States and England” with “the essential and direct End [...] to maintain effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited of the said United States.” Despite these careful considerations, in Article 11 of the same treaty, America promised to respect “the present Possessions of the Crown of France in America as well as those which it may acquire by the future Treaty of peace.”¹² It may be argued that such wording “bound the United States for an indefinite future to the defense of a foreign power’s territory in America, a sure guarantee of involvement [...] in any subsequent quarrel between Britain and France,”¹³ but this is an incorrect assumption. Article 11 did not promise American involvement in protecting France’s possessions in the midst of any future war, but rather our acknowledgment of their possessions at the time of a treaty of peace ending the current conflict.

Our first conflict with the Treaty of Alliance was experienced at the end of the war. The treaty had promised “that the United States would make no separate peace without French concurrence,”¹⁴ but that was not necessarily in the interest of the newly independent States. Once again, compromises were made against the principle of honoring agreements, such as found in the Treaty of Alliance, as the weight of our own interests tipped the balance. Britain sought separate negotiations with hopes of somehow dismantling the Franco-American alliance. In combined negotiations, the French would not have sought the best interests for the United States, but would have sought limited possessions for the United States thus leaving open areas for their own benefit. Thus, diplomacy, as it often does, went

behind closed doors as the parties involved sought their best interests. Indeed, we did achieve greater interests, and were given greater boundaries than could have been expected, at the cost of compromising our prior commitment to France. France “was prepared to accept less than the borders the United States wanted,”¹⁵ but in dealing directly with Britain, the boundaries were extended to including the “territory between the mountains and the Mississippi.”¹⁶

After the formation of our nation, the United States proceeded with its commercial agenda. Though the nations of Europe repeatedly found themselves in conflict, commerce and trade were necessary for the livelihood of our people. We quickly found that commercial activities across the Atlantic are easily intertwined with “political, legal, and diplomatic systems of Europe.”¹⁷ If we wished to progress in such a commercial market, we needed “a more centralized federal union”¹⁸ to maintain a governing balance between European diplomacy, Atlantic commerce, and commercial activities between the states. This led to the ratification of our current Constitution.

The Constitution was drafted “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”¹⁹ These universal principles were followed within the scope of American interests, and although they made it possible to make foreign policy ensuring such interests, they were not applied universally in regards to foreign peoples within our country. Indeed the words of the Constitution imply directly to “ourselves and our posterity.” There were other peoples who were in direct conflict with our interests, and these Constitutional principles have thus not been extended to them. This has been demonstrated in the history of slaves and Indians.

Our Declaration of Independence was founded upon the principle “that all men are created equal [...] and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights [such as] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”²⁰ Certainly these rights were understood to be universal, yet our founders did not apply them universally. Though “they recognized slavery as evil as a matter of principle,” they allowed slavery to continue, because the commercial interests of the nation were at stake. The southern States would never have joined with such a risk. The Constitution itself may not have been ratified if slavery had been outlawed. The principle of personal liberties could not outweigh the interest, and while there were those who opposed slavery, they “fear[ed] of what a suddenly liberated army of slaves might do to their former owners.” Indeed, we are still engaged in a “ceaseless effort to reconcile universal principle and selfish interest.”²¹

The most important form of interest in our day today is that of expansion, which is in perfect compliance with the principle of pursuing our happiness. However, this interest is one which applies to our happiness, not that of others, namely those who currently inhabit the land. Our government was “constructed by the people for the purpose of protecting *their* life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness,” and nothing was to restrict “their efforts to acquire and settle [...] the most fertile and potentially productive lands on earth, lands that in the common view of Americans were simply ‘empty’.”²² We know today that Indians still inhabit lands to the west of us, lands that we currently claim ownership of, although none of our people currently live on those lands.

These same selfish interests prevalent in our domestic society have also spilled into our affairs with nations foreign to this hemisphere. The very first indication of interest overpowering the principle of liberty for other nations was in the treaty made with Britain in 1794, known as Jay’s Treaty. Though in the previous war, Britain had been our enemy

whilst France our ally, President Washington found it in the best interest of the nation to negotiate with England. Europe was once again in the midst of war, and France was in the middle of its own revolution. Public sentiment was furious that while our allied nation France was “wrestling for liberty [and] those sacred principles which have laid the foundation of our freedom in the blood of our dearest citizens,” Jay’s Treaty was with “our inveterate enemy, and the foe of human happiness.”²³ President Washington, however, believed that the treaty was in our best interest, for he “recognized the massive dependence of the American economy on trade with England” and the treaty proved effective in that it “postponed war with England until America was economically and politically more capable of fighting.”²⁴

Since the American Revolution, the power that the United States has enjoyed has mostly rested on our neutrality in European turmoil, and our ability to capitalize from the misfortunes of those conflicts. The United States has gained great advantages by consistently pitting the British against the French, and vice versa. This understanding of the “European equilibrium” most likely came after the colonists “manag[ed] to throw British power against France to drive the French from the North American Continent, and then, within twenty years, to drive the British out of the thirteen colonies by utilizing the power of France.” Perhaps the greatest understanding is obvious by “Thomas Jefferson in his persistent concern for the European equilibrium.”²⁵ Although he was grateful for the Treaty with France and its assistance in winning our independence, Jefferson understood that when it came to such treaties, when “performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation” to the treaties. This is further evidence of interests taking precedence over principles, specifically when “the danger [to our interests] is become real.”²⁶

Only ten years after his support of the Treaty of France, Thomas Jefferson, in his office as President, was able to double the interest and size of the nation through benefiting on the misfortunes of France. Alexander Hamilton attributed the purchase of the territory of Louisiana to “a fortuitous concurrence of unforeseen and unexpected circumstances.”²⁷ It may well be said that acquiring the land through a peaceful exchange was unanticipated, but Hamilton failed to realize that the acquisition of the said territory was well in the mind of Jefferson and plans to achieve such expansion were being discussed. After Spain ceded the territory to France, Jefferson, a longtime advocate of the alliance with France, was quick to suggest the possibility of “marry[ing] ourselves to the British fleet and nation” to maintain the balance of European power. Though “this is not a state of things we [would] seek or desire,” the possibility of a nation stronger than Spain maintaining control over “New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market,”²⁸ was a risk that threatened our interests of commerce and expansion. When the opportunity was presented to purchase the territory of Louisiana through peaceful means, the United States took full advantage of it.

Within a year of the negotiations to purchase the Louisiana territory, President Jefferson sent Captains Meriwether Lewis & William Clark on an expedition to explore the newly claimed land. They were dispatched in search of a waterway across North America “for the purposes of commerce,” with instructions to note the specific geography of the land and the people that inhabited it. Jefferson advised Lewis and Clark on the importance of having “knowledge of these people” and instructed them further to take note of what he called “the extent & limits of their possessions,”²⁹ but these possessions were not considered as viable ownership. Historically, we have given greater acknowledgement to European

claims of ownership, and although the French did not occupy the Louisiana territory as the Indians did, the United States laid claim on the land through a purchase from France.

Lewis & Clark were sent with directions to familiarize the Indians with American principles and “our wish to be neighborly, friendly, and useful to them,”³⁰ but only a few years showed that American interests did not allow for the Indians themselves to have “certain unalienable rights [of] life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”³¹ President Jefferson widely publicized the acquisition and exploration of the western continent. His dream, however, was one for the American people and their interests, as Jefferson believed that the Indians needed to “willingly abandon traditional ways, take up the plough, and eventually melt into the larger white population.”³²

The Indians did not abandon their own desires, and some even pursued their own interests of desiring the tribes to “unite and [...] consider their land as the common property of the whole.”³³ This dream was destroyed, however, when a war ensued, not out of their unification, but out of alliance with the British in the War of 1812. President James Madison urged Congress to declare war against Britain citing various offenses, one of which was concerning the Indians. He contended “the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers” was initiated by “constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons, [thus] connecting their hostility with that influence.”³⁴ President Madison gave other compelling reasons for declaring war on England, but those reasons also applied to France. France and England were engaged in a European war between themselves, but both violated the neutrality of the United States by seizing American ships and confiscating their cargo.

America could have declared war on both England and France, based on the principles of “the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God

entitle[d] them,”³⁵ but our interest outweighed our principle of defending our national honor. Though defense of our honor was given as reason to war with England, there were no interests to gain from declaring war on France. There were, however, potential security and property gains from a war with England. It was the British who were trading with the Indians in the west, and could pose a threat to western expansion. It was also the British who held possession of one of the few remaining European colonies in North America, that of Canada. Thomas Jefferson looked forward to a “final expulsion of England from the American continent,”³⁶ while President Madison believed that “the United States could [...] subdue England by taking over Canada and denying its products to the empire.”³⁷ If the United States had conquered Canada, this would have given us a much larger control over the commercial interests of the entire North American continent. The only remaining forces in opposition would have been the Spanish in the south.

The Spanish did not pose so great a threat to American interests, as they were engulfed in rebellions and uprisings all throughout the Spanish American colonies. The United States remained neutral throughout these wars between Spain and their colonies, but eventually the British requested the United States not only to remain neutral, but to join them in a declaration to “aim not at the possession of any portion of them” and to prevent “any portion of them transferred to any other Power.”³⁸ The British were concerned for their own interests, fearing that the French, or any other power, would join with Spain in fighting against the newly formed governments. The United States feared this as well, but despite the possibility of it being “beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed,”³⁹ it did not correspond with the interests of the United States “to renounce publicly further acquisitions of territory.”⁴⁰

The United States supported the principles of liberty for the Spanish colonials against European interference, but the desire for expansion of American interests has always been primary. After the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, the United States enjoyed a transcontinental ownership, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but this did not prevent future desire for their “dominion [...] to extend, now to the Isthmus of Panama, and hereafter over all the regions of the New World.”⁴¹ In 1823, Thomas Jefferson confessed having “looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States.”⁴² Surely ownership of Cuba would have great economic interest for the United States, but it was not the only area of interest in America’s view. Americans continued to push westward, with Texas joining the list of coveted lands. Though it was hoped that these territories “might someday desire annexation to the Union,”⁴³ there was always the possibility that “emergencies may arise.”⁴⁴ These emergencies most certainly could be found in some future conflict or war, and although America professes, “she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy,”⁴⁵ she “[does] not find it easy to ignore the ‘monsters’ [she] encounter[s].”⁴⁶ By being so aware of such encountering monsters, the United States keeps her eyes open for emergencies wherein the necessitation for conquest arises.

To secure our interests, President James Monroe set forth a doctrine that may help in reducing the number of ‘monsters’ we may face in the future. By declaring to the world that the western hemisphere is independent from the east, he warned the nations of Europe of “any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”⁴⁷ In addition to outlining these boundaries of the hemispheres, Monroe thus placed a “justification [...] for future U.S. interventions throughout Latin America.”⁴⁸ What the future holds for the United States, however, must begin with the west.

In the west lies an incredible frontier with a variety of potential interests to satisfy the demands of a people seeking further opportunities and happiness. This happiness is achieved with principles of liberty and interests of property. The great challenge that we are faced with, however, is that which faces every individual and community. It is the challenge of balancing our stated principles with our interests. Indeed it is important that we pursue our own happiness in liberty, but if we seek our own interests by impeding those of others, such force denies the spirit of liberty by which our nation was established. John Quincy Adams warned against this “change from liberty to force” as threatening our becoming “the dictatress of the world.”⁴⁹ Surely we have been successful in securing our freedom on this land. As we have dealt with foreign nations, we have achieved our interests in acquiring land to the west, establishing free trade with nations in the east, and securing recognition of our sovereignty. Compromising our principles, however, has tainted our degree of success.

Let us remember and never forget that the United States holds the attention of the entire world. All nations will look upon our nation as if we sit as “a City upon a Hill,” and they wish to know the extent of our success or failure in this creation for liberty. We have set forth good and honest principles as a beacon for the world, “but if our hearts shall turn away so that we will not obey, but shall be seduced and worship [...] our pleasures, and profits, and serve [our own interests],”⁵⁰ then the world will watch our demise. We must strive to be the “well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all,” while remaining as “the champion and vindicator only of her own.”⁵¹ Let us seek an equilibrium of principle and interest, so that future generations will speak of their forefathers in reverence and live in emulation of the standards embodied in our spirit of freedom.

NOTES

¹ “The Declaration of Independence,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 35-37.

² John Winthrop, “Governor John Winthrop Envisions a City Upon a Hill, 1630,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 31.

³ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵ John Adams, “John Adams of Massachusetts Explains French Interest in American Independence and Cautions Against Alliance, 1775,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 31.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁸ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Treaty of Alliance with France and American Isolationism,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 44.

⁹ “Foreign Policy Powers in the Constitution, 1789,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 41-42.

¹⁰ “President George Washington Cautions Against Factionalism and Permanent Alliances in His Farewell Address, 1796,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 67.

¹¹ “Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, 1778,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 37.

¹² “Treaty of Alliance with France, 1778,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 38-39.

¹³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Treaty of Alliance with France and American Isolationism,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 46.

¹⁴ Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 20.

¹⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Treaty of Alliance with France and American Isolationism,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 46.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁷ Peter S. Onuf and Leonard J. Sadosky, “American Internationalism and the U.S. Constitution,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 51.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁹ “The Constitution of the United States of America,” in American Legal History: Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., eds. Kermit L. Hall, Paul Finkelman & James W. Ely, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 676.

²⁰ “The Declaration of Independence,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 35.

²¹ Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 43-46.

²² *Ibid.*, 74-75.

²³ “A Democratic-Republican Society Blasts Jay’s Treaty, 1795,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 64.

²⁴ Joseph J. Ellis, “The Sage of Mount Vernon Versus the Ideologue of Monticello,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 71.

²⁵ Norman A. Graebner, "The Pursuit of Interests and a Balance of Power," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 13.

²⁶ Thomas Jefferson, "Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson Defends the Treaty with France, 1793," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 57.

²⁷ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist Alexander Hamilton Debunks Jefferson's Diplomacy, 1803," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 86.

²⁸ Thomas Jefferson, "President Thomas Jefferson Assesses the French Threat in New Orleans, 1802," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 81-83.

²⁹ Thomas Jefferson, "Jefferson Instructs Captain Meriwether Lewis on Exploration, 1803," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 87-88.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

³¹ "The Declaration of Independence," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 35.

³² James P. Ronda, "Indian Country," 740; quoted in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed., eds. Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 62.

³³ "Shawnee Chief Tecumseh Condemns U.S. Land Grabs and Plays the British Card, 1810," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 109.

³⁴ James Madison, "President James Madison Urges Congress to Declare War on Great Britain, 1812," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 113.

³⁵ "The Declaration of Independence," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 34.

³⁶ Thomas Jefferson, "Former President Jefferson Predicts the Easy Conquest of Canada, 1812," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 114.

³⁷ Garry Wills, "Economic Coercion and the Conquest of Canada: Madison's Failed Diplomacy," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 120.

³⁸ George Canning, "British Foreign Secretary George Canning Proposes a Joint Declaration, 1823," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 134.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁴⁰ William E. Weeks, "The Age of Manifest Destiny Begins," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 148.

⁴¹ Don Luis de Onis, quoted in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed., eds. Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 97.

⁴² Thomas Jefferson, "Thomas Jefferson Advises President James Monroe to Cooperate with Britain, 1823," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 135.

⁴³ William E. Weeks, "The Age of Manifest Destiny Begins," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 148.

⁴⁴ John Quincy Adams, "John Quincy Adams Argues Against a Joint Anglo-American Declaration in the Cabinet Meeting of November 7, 1823," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 136.

⁴⁵ John Quincy Adams, “Secretary of State John Quincy Adams Warns Against the Search for ‘Monsters to Destroy,’ 1821,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 133.

⁴⁶ Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 46.

⁴⁷ James Monroe, “The Monroe Doctrine Declares the Western Hemisphere Closed to European Intervention, 1823,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 137.

⁴⁸ William E. Weeks, “The Age of Manifest Destiny Begins,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 149.

⁴⁹ John Quincy Adams, “Secretary of State John Quincy Adams Warns Against the Search for ‘Monsters to Destroy,’ 1821,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 133.

⁵⁰ John Winthrop, “Governor John Winthrop Envisions a City Upon a Hill, 1630,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 31.

⁵¹ John Quincy Adams, “Secretary of State John Quincy Adams Warns Against the Search for ‘Monsters to Destroy,’ 1821,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 133.

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