

America: 1824 - 1900

Words of Isolation, Acts of Imperialism

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In his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe declared the doctrine of Western Hemispheric independence. In defense of independent South American nations, Monroe warned that America would see “any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling [...] their destiny, by any European power [...] as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”¹ His declaration only corroborated conventional American principles of isolation as manifested in President George Washington’s farewell address when he warned against foreign entanglements.² The events of the remaining three quarters of the 19th Century, however, did not reflect this rhetoric. Instead of isolation, the United States pursued five key interests: (1) Continental Expansion, (2) Self-Preservation, (3) Commercial Domination, (4) Global Arbitration, and the preceding four all contributing to the primary interest, (5) Imperialism. Although these interests were not widely published, they dominated the next 75 years of American foreign policy, each interest building upon another, as the United States moved from having mere hemispheric power to establishing international authority.

The American interest for continental expansion began with the first challenge on its borders, or perhaps more appropriately, within its borders: the Native Americans. Following President Monroe, in 1825, the nation elected John Quincy Adams as the sixth president of the United States. Twenty-three years earlier, Adams asked, “shall the fields and the vallies which a beneficent God has framed to teem with the life of innumerable multitudes, be condemned to everlasting barrenness?”³ He was referring to the lands inhabited by the American Indians. In the eyes of Americans, expanding to the west and the “eventual American conquest of Indian Territory was preordained, the inevitable consequence of the great disparity between an increasingly modern commercial society and the Indians’ primitive ways.”⁴ For the first fifty years of its existence, the government of the United

States was proactive in obtaining lands from the Indians, purchasing lands from tribesmen who often “had no right to sell the claim they set up.”⁵ By the time President Andrew Jackson took over in 1829, American sentiment was completely aligned with what would later be known as the policy of Indian Removal.

The Indian Removal Act of 1830 provided for the “exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi.”⁶ This was not a new idea, for Indian Removal had been an idea of Thomas Jefferson’s after the Louisiana Territory was purchased in 1803. Jefferson “succeeded only, however, in convincing the lower Cherokees to exchange land, and in 1810 about 1,000 Cherokees moved to Arkansas.”⁷ This time, the increasing desire for expansion pushed toward coercion. Indians protested the act, even bringing it before the U.S. Supreme Court in *Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia* (1831), but the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction. The Indians were removed, but this was only the beginning. Just as the initial plans were to remove “the tribes [from] the fertile hills and valleys that [the American people] coveted,”⁸ the subsequent plans sought to obtain all fertile lands west of the Mississippi and perhaps as far south as to the Isthmus of Panama.

The United States justified the taking of lands from the Indians by using claims such as those of John Quincy Adams who believed that the land was given to the American people from God. This belief of divine calling was reiterated in the writings of Democratic Publicist John L. O’Sullivan, the author of America’s “Manifest Destiny.” O’Sullivan claimed that America was “destined for better deeds [and] to be the great nation of futurity.”⁹ This idea of destiny dominated American interest for continental expansion, and paved the way for President James K. Polk, and one of the first controversial wars in the history of the United States.

In 1846, President Polk asked Congress for a declaration of war claiming, “War exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself.”¹⁰ Although he attempted to place the fault of war upon Mexico, just a year earlier, Polk defended his plans for the annexation of Texas, and disregarded Mexico’s claim of the land. For years the boundaries of Texas had been disputed, and in Polk’s address, he asserted that Texas was an independent power “competent to contract.”¹¹ In the same address, Polk confirmed his desire of expansion by reaffirming “the right of the United States to that portion of *our territory* which lies beyond the Rocky Mountains” (italics added).¹² In the end, the war with Mexico proved to be a victory for the interest of continental expansion, extending the continental territory of the United States by 500,000 square miles.

Just as the interest of continental expansion began with the Indians, the growth of American territory following America’s war with Mexico continued the focus on Indians. Removing the Indians to tracts of land west of the Mississippi was only a temporary solution. Now that the United States laid claim of a transcontinental empire from the Atlantic to the Pacific, an inhabiting nation of American Indians continued to be “a casualty of westward expansion.”¹³ The years from 1865 to 1887 were filled with “intermittent and barbarous warfare, of broken pacts and broken promises, of greed and selfishness, [and] of alternating aggression and vacillation.”¹⁴ President Rutherford B. Hayes recognized that “when [the Indians] had settled down upon lands assigned to them by compact, [...] they were rudely jostled off and thrust into the wilderness again.”¹⁵ Eventually, the Dawes Severalty Act was passed in 1877 to encourage the assimilation of the Indians, rather than annihilation. “Thus did the government pursue a ‘clear pattern of colonialism toward Native Americans’ by the 1890s that set a ‘precedent for imperialist domination’ of Filipinos and other peoples after the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War.”¹⁶

The years of expansion brought many questions regarding the institution of slavery, whether to expand its influence westward, or limit it to the southern states. As the nation grew increasingly divided by abolitionists and pro-slavery advocates, “the United States lacked a consensus to undertake further bold ventures in international affairs.”¹⁷ Foreign policy was placed aside as Congress focused on the interests at home. Various conciliatory statutes were passed, including “the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, [and] the Fugitive Slave Act.”¹⁸ When compromise could no longer appease the demands of both sides, secession was the outcome, followed by the Civil War. With the nation split in two, the interest of self-preservation became the guiding force of American foreign affairs. This interest was achieved, as two concerns became the primary focus of American diplomacy: preventing foreign recognition of southern independence and defending western hemispheric independence as proclaimed by the Monroe Doctrine.

At the beginning of the secession, Secretary of State William H. Seward suggested that the President “rouse a vigorous continental *spirit of independence* on this continent against European intervention.”¹⁹ President Abraham Lincoln first issued a blockade, demanding for the prevention of foreign vessels to enter southern ports. Seward defended this policy, warning the British in 1861 that it was within the “clear right [of the United States] to suppress insurrection.”²⁰ The Confederate Government, seeking foreign diplomacy, “sent abroad able agents to importune for recognition, to float loans, to purchase cruisers, and to spread propaganda.”²¹ This led to the *Trent* affair, when U.S. Navy Captain Charles Wilkes intercepted the vessel carrying the Confederate agents. His bringing the agents back to the United States was condemned in Britain as an illegal act of impressing, but in the United States he was revered for “the patriotic impulse by which he was inspired.”²²

The leaders of the Union were well aware that “domestic strife invites foreign difficulties,”²³ and as it was European custom to take advantage of such opportunities, America watched closely the threats in the western hemisphere. In order to secure the interest of self-preservation, American foreign policy needed to reiterate the hemispheric independence principle of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1862, when “Spanish, French, and British forces [fought] against Mexico,” Secretary Seward argued for western hemispheric independence, claiming, “in the President’s opinion, the emancipation of this continent from European control has been the principal feature in its history.”²⁴ It could be argued that this was merely in conformance to the principle of isolation, but European interaction with Mexico had nothing to do with America avoiding foreign entanglements. The fact that neighboring Mexico could pose no threat to the United States allowed the United States to focus on its own internal strife. The possibility of a European imperialist power controlling its southern border was a threat against the preservation of the United States as a whole.

This self-preserving interest of remaining in a non-threatened state, extended not only across the continent, but also across the entire hemisphere. Before the Civil War broke out, the United States attempted to purchase Cuba from Spain. This desire was manifested for years, even acknowledged by leaders as early as Thomas Jefferson. This time, in 1854, three pro-slavery advocates who sought to annex Cuba presented the Ostend Manifesto. It pushed for the purchase of Cuba, but in the event that the offer was “refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union.”²⁵ The Manifesto continued its claim that to ensure internal peace, self-preservation required that if the “question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law human and Divine, we shall be justified in

wresting it from Spain.”²⁶ This suggests that the interest of self-preservation leads to the conquest of a neighboring nation, or in other words, imperialism.

After the Civil War, American foreign policy turned from self-preservation to the interest of commercial domination. This interest had also been a focus before the Civil War, as the United States turned its efforts to extending commerce into Asia. To compete with European commerce, in 1843, Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent Caleb Cushing to China. He instructed Cushing to make the power of the United States known to the Emperor and that offense would be taken “if greater privileges, or commercial facilities, should be allowed to the subject of any other Government, than should be granted to citizens of the United States.”²⁷ America wanted to ensure that its ability to trade was equal to the trade of foreign nations. It was a principle as early as the American Revolution, when the Model Treaty demanded “Free ships, free goods, freedom of neutrals to trade between port and port of a belligerent.”²⁸

To ensure this freedom, American merchants had suggested only a few years earlier that “a naval force from the United States [...] would, without bloodshed, obtain from [China] such acknowledgments and treaties as would [...] place our commerce upon a secure footing.”²⁹ This suggestion was implemented in the expeditions of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, but it extended beyond China. Under authorization of the United States Government, Commodore Perry sailed in 1853 into Tokyo Bay with a letter from the President requesting trade with Japan. Japan had previously remained closed in isolation, but in the “resulting Treaty of Kanagawa, signed on March 31, 1854, [...] Japan granted the United States most-favored-nation treatment.”³⁰ Then, in 1858, Consul Townsend Harris established another “treaty wherein Japan opened other ports, provided for freedom of trade, and created a tariff schedule.”³¹

The Civil War halted the progress of commercial expansion, but eventually reconstruction of the nation led a revolution of industry that would further enhance efforts toward commercial domination. As the imperial nations of Europe continued to dominate the Chinese trade, the United States sought again to ensure equal opportunity to trade. In 1899, Secretary of State John Hay sent the first Open Door Note to the imperial powers, declaring that America “hopes [...] to retain [in China] an open market for the commerce of the world.”³² The imperial powers accepted the principles, but a Second Open Door Note was sent a year later, affirming the policy of the United States to “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, [...] and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”³³

By the end of the Industrial Revolution, the United States had focused so much of its energy on industry and commerce, as opposed to military build-up, that it “produced six times as much steel, consumed ten times as much energy, and was four times larger in total industrial output” than competing Russia.³⁴ Commercial domination had become the leading interest in the United States so that America maintained a national income and per capita income exceeding all other competing nations. The United States must have known that “with greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad.”³⁵ Stronger military and diplomatic tools would enable the United States to fulfill its aims most assuredly within the interest of imperialism.

As the United States pursued its interests of continental expansion, self-preservation, and commercial domination, the interest of global arbitration also surfaced. The Monroe Doctrine itself was an American attempt to arbitrate all interests connected to the western hemisphere. It was no statement of isolation, but rather reflected the belief of John Quincy Adams of “considering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America.”³⁶ Many

in South America applauded the Monroe doctrine, while nations such as Columbia requested further explanation of the United States' intent. Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina claimed the Monroe Doctrine to have as its "objective the conquest of Spanish America,"³⁷ thus recognizing the underlying interest of continental expansion.

Global arbitration was required during the Civil War, when the United States sought to protect its interest of self-preservation by preventing foreign recognition of southern independence. The interest helped to secure the independence of the United States as a self-governing nation and declare itself as an important power in the world. As European nations proposed intervention to mediate America's Civil War, the French Emperor Napoleon III extended the option, whereupon "Lincoln's Government politely declined."³⁸ Secretary Seward's warning to the European powers of Mexican intervention is also evidence of the combined interests of self-preservation and global arbitration. By attempting to pronounce American recognition of Mexican independence, the United States was assuming its role as mediator on the globe, a role that assumes global power and demands respect.

The interest of global arbitration was also successfully achieved as the nation sought commercial domination. When Caleb Cushing was instructed to negotiate trade with China, his strategy was to arbitrate all of China's trade, mediating between existing foreign trade negotiations. In defending "Chinese territorial and administrative"³⁹ independence in the Second Open Door Note, the United States as arbiter sought the authority to govern in foreign affairs on the eastern hemisphere. This arbitration in the nations of Asia was an American attempt to compete in the world of imperialism, as the nations of Europe turned their efforts to the Pacific.

The acquisition of lands far from the original continent of North America, specifically in the Pacific, shows the extended interest of imperialism that grew in the heart of the American empire. In regard to the interest of imperialism, it can be argued that the United States was never an imperial power, but that the actions of its Government were always in line with the preceding four interests. Imperialism is here defined as the practice of a nation extending its territory by the acquisition of foreign land. This definition makes no distinction of how foreign nations may interpret the expansionary acts or whether imperial intentions are declared. With this definition of imperialism, the United States can clearly be classified as an imperialist nation. Its interest of imperialism was accomplished by the acquisition of Indian lands by the Removal Policy as well as the extending of its western territory by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo following the war with Mexico. The purchasing of territory is also an acquisition of land; thus, it is imperialism according to the above definition. Therefore, the Louisiana Purchase, the purchase of Alaska, and the attempted purchase of Cuba would all fall under evidence of the United States as an imperialist power. Leaving all of these events aside, the assertion of American imperialist intention is substantiated by the end of the 19th Century in the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War.

When foreign nations proposed to interfere through mediation of the American Civil War, the North made all efforts to define it as an internal conflict. When Spain, however, was faced with insurrections in its own colonies in Cuba and the Philippines, the United States found it within its interest to interfere. Compared to the American Civil War, Lincoln's view was "that the war was a noble and worthy cause precisely because it was *not* a war fought exclusively for interest."⁴⁰ In President William McKinley's address to Congress, he emphasized first, "the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,

bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries,” and then, he claimed, “the right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people.”⁴¹ McKinley seems to argue also for a noble and worthy cause, but his imperialist interest of commerce outweighed any moral interest. Indeed, after the war, the Platt Amendment restricted the independence of Cuba fulfilling the prophesy of Juan Bautista Alberdi, making Cuba a “protectorate by the United States.”⁴²

The most notable of American imperialist acquisitions was that of the Philippines. After the Spanish-American war, the United States purchased the Philippines and became the new colonial owner. Just as the Filipinos rebelled against the Spanish, they fought against the United States in the Philippine-American War. “The U.S. established stable colonial control of the northern islands while the war in the south was taking place,” despite continuous “denials of its existence.”⁴³ At this time, the American Anti-Imperialist League spoke out against American occupation, demanding, “Congress be promptly convened to announce to the Filipinos our purpose to concede to them the independence for which they have so long fought and which of right is theirs.”⁴⁴ Though this would be the “noble and worthy cause,” it was not the purpose of the imperialist United States. President McKinley defended the acquisition of the Philippines claiming, “we could not leave them to themselves – they were unfit for self-government.”⁴⁵ President McKinley then confirmed American imperialist intention when he admitted his order “to put the Philippines on the map of the United States.”⁴⁶ At the close of the 19th Century, words of isolation were abandoned for the manly words of imperialism. As Theodore Roosevelt preached the manly virtues of overseas expansion, he condemned isolationist notions to “sit huddled within our borders,” and called upon America to “boldly face the life of strife, resolute to do our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold righteousness by deed and by word.”⁴⁷

The origins of American isolationism are as old as the first settlers of the New World. The original intent of the Puritans was embodied in the words of Governor John Winthrop, who envisioned “a City upon a Hill.”⁴⁸ These words were “emblazoned in the American self-image, [...] and generations of Americans have considered this ‘exemplarist’ purpose the country’s original mission in its pure, uncorrupted form: the desire to set an example to the world, *but from a safe distance*” (italics added).⁴⁹ This “safe distance” was reiterated in the Monroe Doctrine, so as to uphold conventional American principles of avoiding foreign entanglements. As words of isolation continued to dominate the rhetoric of American aspiration from 1824 to 1900, acts of imperialism dominated the actual course of events. Interests of continental expansion, self-preservation, commercial domination, and global arbitration, contributed to the primary interest of imperialism as the United States increased its territory and its influence on both hemispheres, thus, establishing international authority. By the end of the 19th Century, the original intent “to uphold righteousness” evolved from being an example in isolation to striving for the “goal of true national greatness,” achieved by “stern men with empires in their brains,”⁵⁰ and imperialism in their hearts.

NOTES

¹ James Monroe, “The Monroe Doctrine Declares the Western Hemisphere Closed to European Intervention, 1823,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 137.

² George Washington, “President George Washington Cautions Against Factionalism and Permanent Alliances in His Farewell Address, 1796,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 67-68.

³ John Quincy Adams, “An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1802, At the Anniversary Commemoration of the First Landing of our Ancestors at That Place” (Boston: Russell & Cutler, 1802), quoted in Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 85.

⁴ Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 83.

⁵ Tecumseh, “Shawnee Chief Tecumseh Condemns U.S. Land Grabs and Plays the British Card, 1810,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 110.

⁶ “The Indian Removal Act Authorizes Transfer of Eastern Tribes to the West, 1830,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 162.

⁷ Theda Perdue, “The Origins of Removal and the Fate of the Southeastern Indians,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 176.

⁸ Robert V. Remini, “Jackson’s Good Intentions and the Inevitability of the Indian Removal Act,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 189.

⁹ John L. O’Sullivan, “Democratic Publicist John L. O’Sullivan Proclaims America’s Manifest Destiny, 1839,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 197-198.

¹⁰ James K. Polk, “Polk asks Congress to Declare War on Mexico, 1846,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 202.

¹¹ James K. Polk, “President James K. Polk Lays Claim to Texas and Oregon, 1845,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 198.

¹² *Ibid.*, 199.

¹³ Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 117.

¹⁴ Samuel Eliot Morison & Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, Volume Two, 4th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), 82.

¹⁵ Rutherford B. Hayes, “Annual Message, 1877,” quoted in Morison & Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, Volume Two, 82.

¹⁶ Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 166.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁹ William H. Seward, “Secretary of State William H. Seward Presents ‘Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration,’ 1861,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 264.

²⁰ William H. Seward, “Seward Warns the British, 1861,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 266.

²¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd Edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), 370.

²² Charles Sumner, “Senator Charles Sumner Taunts John Bull Regarding the *Trent* Affair, 1862,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 268.

²³ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd Edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), 364.

²⁴ William H. Seward, “Seward Warns Europe Against Intervention in Mexico, 1862,” quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 269.

²⁵ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd Edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), 322.

²⁶ Ibid., 322.

²⁷ Daniel Webster, "Secretary of State Daniel Webster Instructs Caleb Cushing on Negotiating with China, 1843," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 237.

²⁸ Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Model Treaty," Diplomacy of American Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), quoted in Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 61.

²⁹ "American Merchants in Canton Plead for Protection During the Opium Crisis, 1839," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 234.

³⁰ Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, A History: To 1920, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 140.

³¹ Ibid., 141.

³² John Hay, "The First Open Door Note Calls for Equal Trade Opportunity in China, 1899," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 362.

³³ John Hay, "The Second Open Door Note Calls for Preservation of Chinese Independence, 1900," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 364.

³⁴ Paul Kennedy, "U.S. Industrialization and World Power," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 309.

³⁵ Fareed Zakaria, "State-Centered Realism: How a Weak U.S. Government Inhibited America's Rise to World Power," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 317.

³⁶ William E. Weeks, "The Age of Manifest Destiny Begins," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 147.

³⁷ Juan Bautista Alberdi, "Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina Warns Against the Threat of 'Monroism' to the Independence of Spanish America, n.d.," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 139.

³⁸ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd Edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), 373.

³⁹ John Hay, "The Second Open Door Note Calls for Preservation of Chinese Independence, 1900," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 364.

⁴⁰ Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 267.

⁴¹ William McKinley, "President McKinley Asks Congress to Authorize War on Spain, 1898," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 333.

⁴² Juan Bautista Alberdi, "Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina Warns Against the Threat of 'Monroism' to the Independence of Spanish America, n.d.," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 139.

⁴³ Jim Zwick, "Duration of Philippine-American War: 1899-1913." 4 February 1999. Sentenaryo / Centennial: The Philippine Revolution and Philippine-American War. <http://www.boondocksnet.com/centennial/setexts/zwick99a.html> (7 December 2006).

⁴⁴ "American Anti-Imperialist League Platform, 1899," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 334.

⁴⁵ William McKinley, "McKinley Preaches His Imperial Gospel, 1899," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 336.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 336.

⁴⁷ Theodore Roosevelt, "New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt Preaches the Manly Virtues of Overseas Expansion, 1899," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 397-399.

⁴⁸ John Winthrop, "Governor John Winthrop Envisions a City Upon a Hill, 1630," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 31.

⁴⁹ Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 7.

⁵⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, "New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt Preaches the Manly Virtues of Overseas Expansion, 1899," quoted in Merrill & Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, 397-399.

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