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**THE LESSON OF IMPERIALISM:  
DENIAL**

A MIDTERM ESSAY IN  
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Among scholars who believe that an American Empire exists, there are two known schools of thought: those who promote it and those who vilify it. These contrasting views are found when comparing Niall Ferguson's *Colossus* to Chalmers Johnson's *The Sorrows of Empire*, showing the American Empire can be viewed as either positive or negative. By appropriately examining both works, however, it is shown that the American Empire contains both positive *and* negative aspects, which leads to a third school of thought. By discussing imperialist actions rather than labeling nations as empires, the United States can confess that American imperialism exists. However, it remains in America's best interest to deny the existence of the nation as an empire, while understanding the positive and negative characteristics of imperialism. It remains important to analyze American imperial undertakings to avoid the threats of internal corruption and imperial overstretch that felled previous empires. In addition, Americans must understand the unique threat that faces the nation today. Imperial powers in the past were self-proclaimed empires in an age accepting of empires, whereas the United States has developed while claiming to be the antithesis of empire in an age of sovereign nation-states. Once the United States is labelled as an empire, foreign nations will then have greater cause to pursue the fall of the American Empire. In order to maintain its hegemony, or its imperial power, the United States must remain true to the principle that has enabled its rise beyond the Age of Empires: the principle of imperial denial.

This paper compares the definitions of imperialism and its origins in American history as explained by Ferguson and Johnson. An analysis is then offered as to the imperial undertakings of the United States and its successes and failures. Finally, the possibilities for the future of the "empire" are examined. Either the United States should seize its role as a modern empire, seek revolution against what has become an empire, or follow its pattern of imperial denial sustaining

its legitimacy as the nation of freedom and progress. From this discussion, it will be realized that imperial denial is the best strategy in supporting the interests of America's so-called empire.

### **The Age of Empire**

The world has passed through many ages, but the Age of Empire is uniquely set apart as a period of imperialism. This could be understood as a period fraught with conquering peoples and expanding territories. When imperial leaders set out to rule the world, usually that meant militarily, economically, culturally, and politically. Following this era, scholars have sought to expound on the definition of imperialism, adding their own interpretations to the term. These interpretations range from being very broad, to being specific, and finally, extremely narrow. Some adhere to the broad definition of empire as “multiethnic conglomerates held together by transnational organizational and cultural ties.”<sup>1</sup> Given this definition, any nation could be considered an empire, so long as it contains people of different ethnic backgrounds and is part of the global community. In being more specific, other definitions of empire separate imperialism between different categories, distinguishing between soft and hard power. Using one such idea, American imperialism is guided “by the ‘soft power’ of information networks and popular culture rather than by hard power of economic exploitation and military force.”<sup>2</sup> A more constricted definition is often adhered to by those who deny the existence of American imperialism, calling upon comparisons with empires of the past. These scholars explain how previous empires “wanted land, colonies, treasure, and grabbed all they could get,” and how such empires would “have contenders that check their power and through rivalry drive their ambitions.”<sup>3</sup> Whereas in past empires, other nations checked and drove imperial powers, in the context of the American empire, it is the people of the nation who drive the ambitions of its political leaders.

As most scholars who argue for the existence of an American Empire, Ferguson and Johnson both adhere to specific definitions of imperialism when forming their arguments. In *Colossus*, Ferguson couples imperialism with expansion; showing how early American leaders referred to the United States as an empire. He quotes Thomas Jefferson in his being “persuaded no constitution was ever before as well calculated as ours for extending extensive empire and self-government.”<sup>4</sup> If imperialism meant expansion, then the means whereby the United States expanded was simply its own form of imperialism. Ferguson argues this imperialism “would not be an empire based on conquest, [but] rather, it would be an empire purchased for cash – or, to be precise, for government bonds.”<sup>5</sup> He refers to instances such as the Louisiana Purchase from France, payments paid in 1848 and 1853 following the war with Mexico, and the purchase of Alaska from Russia.<sup>6</sup> Ferguson’s imperialism was one of expansion with origins as early as the inception of the American Republic. Whereas the original notions of expansion included territory and American self-government, James Madison’s “extend[ing] the sphere”<sup>7</sup> of America would later be specifically defined according to contemporary imperial interests. Imperialism would be engaged by the American military, economy, culture, and politics.

In *The Sorrows of Empire*, Johnson uses a specific definition of imperialism, linking it to militarism. Specifically, Johnson argues, “Imperialism and militarism are inseparable.”<sup>8</sup> By narrowing the discussion to militarism, Johnson explicitly avoids any discussion on economic, cultural, or political imperialism. By so doing, he also argues that the origins of American imperialism were not as early as Ferguson suggests. Johnson argues, “Its roots go back to the early nineteenth century, when the United States declared all of Latin America its sphere of influence and busily enlarged its own territory at the expense of the indigenous people of North America, as well as British, French, and Spanish colonialists, and neighboring Mexico.”<sup>9</sup> This

seems to indicate that American imperialism began with the Monroe Doctrine followed by America's expansion across the continent and the succeeding War with Mexico, while Johnson's chapter on "The Roots of American Militarism" claims "the first militarist tendencies appeared at the end of the nineteenth century."<sup>10</sup> This chapter begins with the Spanish-American War and continues with evidence of militarism in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. This is an obvious contradiction of his earlier assertions that imperialism and militarism were inseparable and whose roots were found in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century.

Determining the origins of imperialism in the United States is a difficult task, but only because of the difficulty in defining imperialism. Scholars have argued for varying interpretations of imperialism, so that the term in dictionaries has yielded itself to individual interpretation. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines it so:

**Imperialism** \ 1: imperial government, authority, or system 2: the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation esp. by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; *broadly*: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.<sup>11</sup>

Giving the term the possibility of being defined broadly, and using words such as power, authority, and influence leave the reader to personal interpretation. This dictionary shows that empire and imperialism have been conflated. The first definition refers to an actual empire, while the second definition is more appropriately one of imperialist action. Imperialism can thus be seen as exerting power over another nation, or mere influence in a nation's affairs. Accepting such a definition, the Age of Empires can no longer be set apart as a specific period in the

world's history. Nearly every government, as far back as the earliest invading civilizations attempted to exert some degree of power or influence on others. The origins of imperialism in America are, therefore, as early as its ancestral colonists. Long before the Puritans held "the desire to set an example to the world,"<sup>12</sup> settlements were set up along the Atlantic coastline with "aggressive expansionism, acquisitive materialism, and an overarching ideology of civilization that encouraged and justified both."<sup>13</sup> America was seen as a land for expansion and opportunity, and led to the extension of a people's power, authority, and influence over the future course of the land. In the world's history of empires, America was formed on the platform of imperialism.

### **The American Empire**

As would be expected, a nation created by people whose parents came from foreign empires inherited many of its imperial ancestral traits. Ferguson gave many examples of the imperial undertakings of the early Americans, but also argued for the limitations placed on such a young empire. It has already been shown how Ferguson argued that America's empire was obtained through purchasing lands, but this buying power was not always successful, nor was it the only means whereby land was acquired. The United States purchased the Louisiana Territory from France, but the opportunity to do so may not have been realized "had it not been for [the British Navy's] dominance of the Atlantic sea-lanes, which had effectively confined Napoleon's power to the European continent."<sup>14</sup> Napoleon's military undertakings in Europe required substantial finances, which were aided by America's offer to purchase Louisiana. The United States effectively exploited the balance of power in Europe to their advantage. It was not just the almighty dollar, but effective diplomatic maneuvering in a time when European powers were preoccupied. If an empire is to be understood as "a major actor in the international system based

on the subordination of diverse national elites, [and] the inequality of power, resources, and influence is what distinguishes an empire from an alliance,”<sup>15</sup> then the United States, in its weak state relative to Europe, was able to manipulate the balance of power through expansionist actions before having the dominance of power in order to be an empire. This suggests a differentiation between imperialism as an action and a state as an empire.

The limits to an American empire are obvious when viewing imperial actions. There were times when expansion failed, especially regarding American endeavors to acquire land northward. This failure came “during the War of Independence and again in the War of 1812,”<sup>16</sup> when imperialism by force was attempted in obtaining Canada. Ferguson is correct in that the “arbitrary two-and-a-half-thousand-mile line perfectly illustrates the limits of nineteenth century American power,”<sup>17</sup> but he fails to realize how that line also shows the increase of American power. Following the War of 1812, the United States had not acquired Canada, but “fighting the world’s strongest navy to a draw was accomplishment enough for most Americans.”<sup>18</sup> Drawing an imaginary line across a continent to claim territory may have been limited in that the line was not drawn at the North Pole, or at the Isthmus of Panama, but the line was drawn. Though it may have been too weak to be labeled as an empire at the time, the strength of the American Republic is apparent in its imperial actions, such as drawing subjective lines as its borders.

Ferguson is also flawed in his assessment of northern imperialism versus southern imperialism. He claims, “Empire appealed much more to the elites of the industrialized North than to the rest of the country.”<sup>19</sup> This argument assumes that Northern commerce dominated American imperialism, but Ferguson acknowledged it to be “true, [that] in the 1850s some southerners had dreamed of striking beyond even Texas to establish new slave states in Central America.”<sup>20</sup> The North and South increasingly separated economically, politically, and socially,

but Southern imperialism was still apparent as Southern elites sought to maintain their power and influence in the American government. In the political battle leading to the Missouri Compromise, southerners defended slavery in order to maintain “the political and sectional balance of power.”<sup>21</sup> The Missouri Compromise was about ensuring that expansion of the nation would also maintain “the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence” of the Southern elites in Congress.<sup>22</sup>

In *The Sorrows of Empire*, Johnson claims the power and influence of imperialism began in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and is inseparably connected to militarism. Johnson’s argument throughout is that the United States was not originally an empire, and that events in its history show a growing of militarism and secrecy unfounded in the original declarations of the founding fathers. Johnson believes that the United States began with an idealistic model condemning imperial indicators such as standing armies, and was led by leaders such as President Washington who warned of “overgrown military establishments.”<sup>23</sup> As the nation grew, however, it took on an increasingly militaristic approach with foreign nations. America found itself engulfed in various wars, after which an empire of bases expanded to ensure stability and protection from further aggression. “To maintain its empire,” Johnson argues, “the Pentagon must constantly invent new reasons for keeping in our hands as many bases as possible long after the wars and crises that led to their creation have evaporated.”<sup>24</sup> This is not to say that the original grounds for entering foreign conflicts were of an imperial nature, for “whatever the original reason the United States entered a country and set up a base, it remains there for imperial reasons.”<sup>25</sup> Johnson’s argument is one of change, from original intent to imperial intent.

As the intent becomes more imperial, the American Republic changes into the American Empire, according to Johnson. By showing changes in American policy or position, Johnson

attempts to provide evidence of this shift from a republic to an empire, for the nation certainly could not “remain a republic if it rules an empire.”<sup>26</sup> If militarism did not exist in the United States in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, but has progressively grown since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, then his argument could be supported. As part of his argument of growing militarism, Johnson argues, “after World War II, high-ranking military officers, including Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, moved into key positions in the civilian hierarchy of political power in a way unprecedented since the Civil War.”<sup>27</sup> While it may be true, it overlooks the fact that “the leading American nationalists and Federalists in 1787 were generally men of experience in military and international affairs.”<sup>28</sup> The first president of the United States was General George Washington, and “James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, [and] Henry Knox [...] had served in diplomatic and military positions at home and abroad.”<sup>29</sup> Even Johnson’s assertion of a growing of secrecy in American diplomacy is challenged by the idea that “secrecy and deception were prominent features of American diplomacy from the start.”<sup>30</sup> During the Revolutionary War, American leaders signed a treaty with France in 1778, secretly agreeing to consult France in treaty negotiations with England. At the conclusion of the war, American interests were better served in obtaining more territory than France would allow, by secretly entering into such a treaty with England.<sup>31</sup> If signs of militarism indicate that the United States is more of an empire than a republic, the American Empire was in the making long before Johnson asserts.

There are many actions in the history of the United States that may be labeled as imperialistic, and both Ferguson and Johnson touch upon those points. Ferguson has made a stronger case that America was built by an expansion motivated people, who rejected from the very beginning any plan “setting western boundaries of the states.”<sup>32</sup> While he argues that America has always been an empire, he concedes, “The American Empire has up until now, with

a few exceptions, preferred indirect rule to direct rule and informal empire to formal empire.”<sup>33</sup> Johnson, on the other hand, argues that America’s involvement in wars has proven it to be an empire of direct rule. The American military has continued to grow, just as Johnson points out, and “its dominance has dramatically increased” to becoming a sole power in a “unipolar era.”<sup>34</sup> Despite this growth, “the cost of the U.S. military has declined steeply in relative terms, from an average of 10 percent of GDP in the 1950’s to just 4 percent in the 1990’s and a forecast 3.5 percent in the first half of the present decade.”<sup>35</sup> The military of the United States is also far different than militaries of past empires. Despite Johnson’s assertion that America has become an “empire of bases,”<sup>36</sup> Ferguson points out that “less than a third of Britain’s total armed forces were stationed in the United Kingdom itself, [while] more than four-fifths – 82 percent – of Americans on active military duty are based in the United States.”<sup>37</sup> This suggests the dominating interest of protecting the United States over any imperial incentives abroad, or at least that control of imperial holdings abroad is not the purpose of the American military.

The most viable argument of the American Empire focuses on the economic aspect of imperialism. In the midst of his focus on militarism, even Johnson recognizes the impact of economics on American imperialist ideology. Though he argues that wars and imperialism “cannot be separated,” he also acknowledges how “an induced economic dependence can sometimes achieve the same effect.”<sup>38</sup> This is found in his claim that “the Clinton administration strongly espoused economic imperialism, [as opposed to] the second Bush government [which] was unequivocally committed to military imperialism.”<sup>39</sup> This suggests that the president in power, rather than the nation as an indefinite empire, determines the type of imperialism through his policies. In his chapter on the “Iraq Wars,” Johnson places a part of the reasoning behind these wars on economic motives, specifically in favor of America’s oil interests. He admits, “it

would be hard to deny that oil, Israel, and domestic politics all played crucial roles in the Bush administration's war against Iraq, but I believe the more encompassing explanation [is] the inexorable pressures of imperialism and militarism."<sup>40</sup> The acceptance of interests other than militarism as being "crucial" suggests that militaristic imperialism was not a sufficient condition for imperial action without these essential influences. Johnson used the right word when he called these interests crucial, for American interests dominate American policy. "The growth of the American empire has come about not so much through a search for economic well-being as through a quest for absolute security,"<sup>41</sup> but this security is absolute in encompassing all crucial interests, including a strong military, economic stability, an open culture, and political freedom.

### **A City Upon a Hill**

An author's motive for writing about the American Empire is to promote one's agenda of what should be done with that empire. In *Colossus*, Ferguson argues for the United States to take its place as a leading empire with the ability to bring stability to the world. His argument, however, is framed around a consciousness of some international order, which the United States has consciously tried to create in the post-war period through institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations and the now defunct Bretton Woods monetary system. In creating this international order, the United States sought to bring stability to the world, as Ferguson argues, in exchange for global legitimacy of American actions. As long as the United States maintains an image inconsistent with empire, its power, authority, and influence will remain unchallenged. The power of the United States as an empire, a republic, or a nation, rests upon the ability for the United States to appear impartial, noninterventionist, and above all, the leader of freedom, *enough* to retain global legitimacy or to retain that appearance. In essence,

the United States must be part of the world, not as a nation, but as “a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people upon us.”<sup>42</sup>

One of the guiding arguments in Ferguson’s *Colossus*, is that America should take the form of a liberal empire:

What is required is a liberal empire – that is to say, one that not only underwrites the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital but also creates and upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function – peace and order, the rule of law, noncorrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies – as well as provides public goods, such as transport infrastructure, hospitals and schools, which would not otherwise exist.<sup>43</sup>

This model is nothing less than the American model on an international scale. The United States was formed on principles of free trade, along with a Constitution ensuring sound laws and policies, while the individual states were to provide public goods. In this demand for a liberal empire, Ferguson is promoting globalization, meaning free international trade, *and* globalism, meaning international government. The paradox in this argument is that the United States, as a government, is based on self-determination. This principle of self-determination requires that the United States maintain its legitimacy in the international community in order to remain a hegemonic power. Once that legitimacy is questioned or lost, an empire could no longer remain in power under the principle of global self-determination, and would need to revert to some form of direct imperial rule, such as coercion.

One of the guiding arguments in Johnson's *The Sorrows of Empire* has been that the United States has been acting under direct imperialism, thereby undermining global and national self-determination. This is found in his discussion on Echelon, a "covert intelligence-sharing arrangement among the English-speaking countries."<sup>44</sup> Johnson argues that Echelon "is operated by the intelligence and military establishments [...] in total secrecy and hence beyond any kind of accountability to representatives of the people it claims to be protecting."<sup>45</sup> Just as domestic policy helps in shaping foreign policy,<sup>46</sup> such impediments to accountability and self-determination in foreign policy must inevitably return in domestic affairs. The Iraq War is one such example, which threatened the legitimacy of the nation in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of many Americans. "The idea of a government acting alone in preemptive war is inherently undemocratic," argue citizens who believe "it does not require or even permit the president to obtain the consent of the governed."<sup>47</sup> The problem with this assertion is that the president did obtain the consent of the governed when Congress authorized the use of force in Iraq. In addition, the rise of militarism and secrecy, as Johnson asserts, is also accountable to the consent of the governed, for Congress still maintains control over financing the military and intelligence community, and can, at any moment, cease its support. Johnson understands this, which is why the only vision he has is one of revolution, wherein "the people could retake control of Congress, reform it along with the corrupted elections laws that have made it into a forum for special interests, [...] and cut off the supply of money to the Pentagon and the secret intelligence agencies."<sup>48</sup>

Self-determination is not only upheld in the United States, but also on a global level, especially when discussing the American Empire. Ferguson has understood this self-determination of the world, agreeing, "this has justly been called an empire by invitation."<sup>49</sup> In

the least invasive form of cultural imperialism, “we must not forget that the rest of the world gives every sign of wanting American prosperity, American entertainment, American styles, and the American language.”<sup>50</sup> This begs the question of how an empire could possibly be such if it was invited. Placing identifying terms such as “empire” on a nation is evidently illogical when that nation does not act imperially. Equally, imperial denial is defined by restricting discussion of imperialism to actions rather than nations, especially in a world of varying degrees of power between nation-states. David A. Lake, a UCSD professor of political science, has written a draft book manuscript wherein he “conceive[s] of hierarchy as a dyadic relationship between two polities that varies across pairs within any system from complete anarchy to full dominance.”<sup>51</sup> In other words, the United States can be dominant relative to another country within this system without justifying the use of the term “empire.” The hierarchy between many nations is determined by the degree to which one nation invites another for assistance. The United States is clearly dominant in many of these dyadic relationships, but rarely is it found in an imperial, or hierarchical, undertaking without invitation or global legitimacy.

### **The Lesson of Imperial Denial**

By restricting imperialism to a discussion of actions rather than labeling nations as empires, America can learn a valuable lesson. That lesson was almost realized by the end of Ferguson’s *Colossus*, when he asks, “Does imperial denial matter? The answer is that it does.”<sup>52</sup> Ferguson understands that imperial denial matters, but fails to understand why. He continues, “Successful empire is seldom solely based on coercion.”<sup>53</sup> The error in Ferguson’s conclusion is found in one word. There has never, in the history of the world, been a successful “empire,” for, as Ferguson earlier admits, “it is one of history’s truisms that empires rise and fall.”<sup>54</sup> Despite the nonexistence of a successful empire, there has been successful “imperialism,” and Ferguson

would be correct in asserting that successful imperialism is seldom based on coercion, for when coercion is implemented, the nation moves further along the hierarchical chain toward full dominance, or empire. The latter part of Ferguson's explanation of successful "imperialism," understands "there must be some economic dividends for the ruled as well as the rulers."<sup>55</sup> This is consistent with William Henry Seward's vision in 1853 of "a form of American imperium that would be welcomed by weaker foreign nations, [and] instead of becoming mere colonial subjects, as they were in the British Empire, American commercial dominance would 'spare their corporate existence and individuality' and thus make them voluntary recipients of American power and protection."<sup>56</sup> Imperial denial is essential in this vision, as is the principle of self-determination and American legitimacy among foreign nations.

Imperial denial has had its roots in American foreign relations as early as American imperialist actions, and as early as imperialism itself. In *Dangerous Nation*, Robert Kagan has pointed out how, "like most expansive peoples – the Greeks and Romans, for instance – Anglo-Americans did not view themselves as aggressors, [but] believed it only right and natural that they should seek independence and fortune for themselves and their families in the New World."<sup>57</sup> This imperial denial extended to Americans before the Revolutionary war, and "in professing colonial disinterest in the late war with France, Franklin helped lay the foundation for the American myth of innocence and self-abnegation – and did so quite successfully."<sup>58</sup> Surely imperial denial was successful, for it found itself in the pages of *Common Sense*, as Thomas Paine argued against "suffering like the wretched Britons under the oppression of the Conqueror."<sup>59</sup> In subsequent conflicts, Americans would go abroad, not as conquerors, but as a liberating nation. The success of imperial denial has ensured that "when the Americans say they come as liberators, not conquerors, they seem to mean it."<sup>60</sup>

## Conclusion

Ultimately, neither Ferguson nor Johnson offer a valid explanation of American imperialism, as both focus on the nation as an empire, rather than its actions as imperial. Both of their arguments offer credible insights as to the positive and negative effects of imperialism, and by studying such, the United States will learn what aspects of imperialism to attach itself to in order to maintain successful imperialism. If it allows itself to be labeled as an empire, then it places itself at the far-end of the hierarchy, its global legitimacy will be threatened, and it will appear to have become what John Quincy Adams warned against. The world would see how “the fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force [...] She might become the dictatress of the world [and] would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.”<sup>61</sup> Imperial denial will prevent the world from envisioning the United States as a dictating empire, thus allowing the United States to pursue its agenda of spreading freedom, making the world safe for democracy, and safe for America. Imperial denial is a principle that will enable Americans to continue their course as examples in the world, but “if we shall deal falsely with our God in this [imperialistic] work we have undertaken, [...] we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.”<sup>62</sup> The nation must move forward, not as an empire, but as a nation, acting imperially when necessary, while maintaining the denial that has enabled the American Republic to achieve a power greater than any empire in history.

## NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Deepak Lal, "In Defense of Empires" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 29.
- <sup>2</sup> James Kurth, "Who Will Do the Dirty Work" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 249.
- <sup>3</sup> Victor Davis Hanson, "What Empire?" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 147-149.
- <sup>4</sup> Thomas Jefferson, quoted in *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*, Niall Ferguson (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 34.
- <sup>5</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 36.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-40.
- <sup>7</sup> James Madison, quoted in *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*, Niall Ferguson (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 34.
- <sup>8</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 30.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.
- <sup>11</sup> *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Eleventh Edition (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2003), s.v. "Imperialism."
- <sup>12</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 7.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>14</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 37.
- <sup>15</sup> Charles S. Maier, "Imperial Limits" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 204.
- <sup>16</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 40.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.
- <sup>18</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 146.
- <sup>19</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 45.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.
- <sup>21</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 196.
- <sup>22</sup> *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Eleventh Edition (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2003), s.v. "Imperialism."
- <sup>23</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 39.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.
- <sup>26</sup> Peter Bender, "The New Rome" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 91.
- <sup>27</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 53.
- <sup>28</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 67.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.
- <sup>30</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 58.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.
- <sup>32</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 34.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.
- <sup>34</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Era" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 49.
- <sup>35</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 263.
- <sup>36</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 151.
- <sup>37</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 208-209.

- <sup>38</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 187.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 257.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 236.
- <sup>41</sup> James Chace, "In Search of Absolute Security" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 121.
- <sup>42</sup> John Winthrop, "Governor John Winthrop Envisions a City Upon a Hill, 1630," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920*, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 31.
- <sup>43</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 2.
- <sup>44</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 165.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 167.
- <sup>46</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 77.
- <sup>47</sup> Wendell Berry, "A Citizen's Response" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 230.
- <sup>48</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 312.
- <sup>49</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 86.
- <sup>50</sup> Jedediah Purdy, "Universal Nation" in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 107.
- <sup>51</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations: Authority, Sovereignty, and the News Structure of World Politics* (Draft Book Manuscript, Revised May 27, 2006), 124 <<http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/HierarchyinInternationalRelations.pdf>>.
- <sup>52</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 294.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 294.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 169.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 294.
- <sup>56</sup> Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 250-251.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.
- <sup>59</sup> Thomas Paine, "Common Sense," in *Collected Writings* (New York: Library of America, 1995), 35.
- <sup>60</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 203.
- <sup>61</sup> John Quincy Adams, in *Dangerous Nation*, Robert Kagan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 162.
- <sup>62</sup> John Winthrop, "Governor John Winthrop Envisions a City Upon a Hill, 1630," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920*, eds. Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 31.

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